How to Construct a Poem: Descartes, Sidney by Raman, Shankar
How to Construct a Poem: Descartes, Sidney
Shankar Raman, MIT
This essay explores the intimate bond in early modern Europe between the premier
science of forms, geometry, and the premier art of forms, poetry. The connections be-
tween these (at least for us) seemingly disparate domains become especially evident in
how geometry and poetry re-envisage the relationship of form to content, of the shapes
they invent to the matters that constitute their specific concerns. I shall be seeking here
to identify parallels that bespeak a broader, shared cultural response across the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries to an inherited Greek tradition, strongly marked by Aristotelian
thought, in which what Sir Philip Sidney would later call the relation of “manner” to “mat-
ter” played a fundamental role. My argument places Rene´ Descartes alongside Sidney as
two of the key figures whose contributions to the theory and practice of mathematics and
poetry respectively reveal with especial vividness both the nature of this response and its
implications for early modern selves and the worlds they sought to make.
Since the breadth of poetry’s cultural aspirations may seem more intuitively obvious
than that of mathematics, let me begin with bolstering the latter case. The very opening
of Descartes’ 1637 Discourse on Method outlines an emerging and influential conception of
what it means to be rational:
Common sense [le bons sens] is the most equitably divided thing [la mieux
partage´e] in the world, for everyone believes he is so well provided with it that
even those who are the hardest to please in everything else usually do not want
more of it than they have. It is not likely that everyone is mistaken in this
matter; rather, this shows that the power to judge correctly and to distinguish
the true from the false – which is, strictly speaking, what we mean by common
sense or reason [la raison] – is naturally equal [e´gale] in all men. Hence the
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diversity of our opinions arises, not because some of us are more reasonable
[raisonnables] than others, but only because we direct our thoughts along dif-
ferent paths, and consider different things. For it is not enough to have a good
mind [l’esprit bon]; the principal thing is to apply it correctly [bien].1
A few features evident in these remarks are worth noting: first, the identification of reason
with common or good sense and reasonableness; second, the postulate of a rational ca-
pacity presumed to be equally distributed, differences being ascribed on the basis of how
this capacity is applied; and, finally, the characterisation of rational capacity as power of
good judgement, one able to distinguish the true from the false – indeed, as we shall see,
Descartes will seek to re-articulate the very criteria for truth and intelligibility.
For our purposes, moreover, it is necessary to recall the fact that the Discourse was orig-
inally a prefatory text to three scientific treatises. While usually published (and discussed)
today as a free-standing work, it first appeared with the Optics [La Dioptrique], the Metere-
ology [Les Me´teores], and, last but not least, the Geometry [La Ge´ome´trie]. Its overarching
claims about the right way to use one’s reason thus envelop these more specific studies. For
Descartes’ mathematical exposition in particular, the making of geometrical space is closely
allied with producing the forms of rationality implied by the passage cited above. And this
coupling in turn demands re-forming selves in ways that make them adequate to these
new demands. Such relationships take us beyond the more narrowly technical achieve-
ments of early modern mathematics, underlining the extent to which a now recognisably
modern scientific thinking was bound up from the very outset with ethical considerations
in Aristotle’s sense of the word, that is, with the settled or characteristic ways human be-
ings act in the world or behave towards others and themselves. Descartes’ Geometry was
never only a signal achievement in the history of mathematics – though it was this too. Its
1Rene´ Descartes, Discourse on the Method in The Philosophical Works of Descartes, trans. and ed. Elizabeth
S. Haldane and G. R.T. Ross (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955), vol. I: 82-3. Translation
modified. Subsequent citations indicated by page number in the body of this chapter.
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specifically mathematical dimensions are intertwined with the ethical question of how a
geometer ought to do geometry, how he should comport himself as mathematician towards
the nature of the mathematical objects that are his concern.
The broader connections between how one does mathematics and the making of things
and selves through mathematics emerge most fully when we consider the extent to which
such reformation was understood through the (renovated) Aristotelian lens of poesis or
making, a term that took on renewed significance in a range of early modern intellectual
domains, including literature. An apt literary analogue may be found in a seminal (for
the English context at least) sixteenth-century work of literary criticism, in which the as-
sertion of the poet as maker takes centre stage: Sir Philip Sidney’s Defence of Poesy [or An
Apology for Poetry]. In a moment that has not drawn much commentary,2 Sidney defends
comedy’s predilection to imitate “the common errors of our life” by drawing a parallel with
mathematics:
Now, as in geometry, the oblique must be known as well as the right, and in
arithmetic, the odd as well as the even: so in the actions of our life, who seeth
not the filthiness of evil, wanteth a great foil to perceive the beauty of virtue.
2To the best of my knowledge, Henry S. Turner’s The English Stage: Geometry, Poetry and the Practical
Spatial Arts 1580-1630 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) is the only book explicitly to draw the con-
nection between geometry and poetry in Sidney’s Defence. My discussion here independently converges at
times with Turner’s, generally with respect to positions already well-established through the history of Sidney
criticism – for instance, the importance of ‘invention’ or the the question of poetry’s epistemological and ethi-
cal value. Turner’s book is valuable, particularly in its reading of English drama, for setting out the relevance
of geometry to early modern poetics. However, its chapter on the relationship between geometry and poetry
in Sidney ultimately sidesteps both geometry and poetry. On the one hand, the reconstruction of sixteenth-
century geometry’s status through title pages, prefaces of books and selective evidence of reading practices
omits the technical content of geometry itself. There is little acknowledgment in his book of the momentous
change in the very content of geometry – and in its relationship to algebra – from the mid-sixteenth to the
mid-seventeenth century. On the other hand, the discussion of Sidney’s Defence does not attend to Sidney’s
own poetic practice. This absence is striking in light of the parallel insistence that geometry’s assimilation
to the practical arts during this period opens up its connection to poetry. The claim regarding geometry’s
practical bias also needs adjustment: not only because John Dee’s much reprinted preface to Euclid, for ex-
ample, does not fully support the assertion, but because the narrow focus on England leaves out the crucial
role of the so-called Republic of Letters. Correspondence networks (exemplified by Marin Mersenne’s role as
intermediary) were, after all, one of the main modes through which mathematical knowledge – theoretical
as well as practical – routinely circulated between (and within) Europe and England.
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This doth comedy handle so in our private and domestical matters, as with
hearing it, we get, as it were, an experience [of] what is to be looked for . . . .3
Sidney posits a curious equivalence between knowing obliqueness or oddness in mathe-
matics and the poetic creation of images of evil: just as we need to understand the odd
to perceive the even, the oblique to see the straight (or, as his resonant pun has it, “the
right”), so to do the “actions of our life” demand poetic images of evil if virtue is to be
visible.
But these images do not simply reflect the external world, for the Defence amplifies
throughout what is already an undercurrent in the Aristotelian notion of mimesis: that
imitation is itself a generative process, a making. When Sidney defines Aristotlean mimesis
as “a representing, counterfeiting, or figuring forth: to speak metaphorically, a speaking
picture” (217), each additional term in this concatenation of definitions enlarges the ambit:
from re-presenting of what is already there, to making something ‘against’ what is there, to
drawing out a new figural reality. The two senses of mimetic production remain in tension
in the Defence: on the one hand, the poet as a “maker,” as in the famous early assertion that
the poet “disdaining to be tied to any such subjection [to nature], lifteth up with vigour of
his own invention, doth grow in effect another nature in making things better than nature
bringeth forth, or quite anew, forms such as never were in nature” (216); and, on the other
hand, the poet as mere “imitator” who “counterfeit[s] only such faces as are set before”
him (218), and “deliver[s] to mankind” only that which has “the works of nature for his
principal object” (215-16).4
3Sir Philip Sidney, The Defence of Poesy in A Critical Edition of the Major Works, ed. Katherine Duncan-
Jones (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 230. All subsequent citations indicated by page number in
the body of this chapter.
4From different perspectives, critics have often remarked upon this tension in Sidney’s oeuvre. According
to Sherrod Cooper, for instance, the poet swings between the claim that art is a means to the end of “rep-
resenting nature accurately” and the countervailing position in which inspiration seems all: “[o]bviously,”
writes Cooper, “the practitioner and the theorist seem at odds with another.” In: The Sonnets of Astrophil and
Stella (The Hague: Mouton, 1968), 14 and 17. Kathy Eden’s rich discussion of a similar duality emphasises
instead the poet’s complex deployment of key Aristotelian texts: “When Sidney defines poetry not only as an
art of imitation but also as an instrument of knowledge, he does so in view of the Poetics and its tradition.
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That Sidney should evoke mathematical analogies in discussing how comedy functions
to produce both knowledge and experience of the ethical and the moral is by no means ac-
cidental. Indeed, the poet’s correspondence with his friend and preceptor Hubert Languet
as well as his brother Robert Sidney documents a sustained interest in the study of ge-
ometry.5 In turn, the implications of “making” or poesis teased out by Sidney spill over in
the early modern period to the kind of knowledge that comes to characterise mathemat-
ics, whereby knowing its “truths” becomes not simply a matter of discovering or imitating
what is already there but increasingly that of producing those truths. David Lachterman’s
assertion about modernity in The Ethics of Geometry is worth stressing here: modernity’s
“thinly-disguised ‘secret,’” he says, is “the willed or willful coincidence of human making
with truth or intelligibility.”6 Such an attitude is central to Cartesian geometry, contributing
signally to the alteration in how mathematics would be practiced and understood in the
early modern period. Conversely, the emerging mathematical attitude to which Descartes
gives especially clear expression is already visible in the theory and practice of poetry
espoused by Sidney.
Two Ways of Completing the Square: Al-Khwarizmi and Descartes
To flesh out the renewed importance of poesis or making to the geometrical project, I
would like to compare two approaches to what is essentially the same mathematical prob-
lem: that of solving a quadratic equation by “completing the square” (described below).
When, on the other hand, he claims for poetry the special task of feigning images designed to inspire the will
to virtuous action, he echoes the De Anima and its tradition.” See Poetic and Legal Fiction in the Aristotelian
Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 158.
5In a 1574 reply to Languet, for instance, Sidney resists the Frenchman’s advice that he give up studying
geometry, promising to “only look through the lattice (so to say) at the first principles of it.” See The Works
of Sir Philip Sidney, ed. Albert Feuillerat (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), vol 3, 84. In
a 1580 letter, Sidney further advises his brother to “take delightin the mathematicals,” and especially in
arithmetic and geometry “so as both in number and measure you might have a feeling and active judgement.”
In: The Correspondence of Philip Sidney and Hubert Languet, ed. William Aspenwall Bradley (Boston: The
Merrymount Press, 1912), 223.
6David Rapport Lachterman, The Ethics of Geometry: A Genealogy of Modernity (London, Routledge,
1989), ix.
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The first derives from a foundational Arabic treatise on algebra that preserves and builds
on Euclidean principles, The Algebra of Al-Khowarizmi. Written by the great 9th-century
Arab mathematician Mohammed ibn Musa al-Khowarizmi, the work became available in
the European world through its twelfth-century Latin translation by Robert of Chester.
(Complicating this chain of transmission further, I will cite the twentieth-century trans-
lation of the Latin text.7) Descartes’ 1637 Ge´ome´trie adopts a very different approach,
one that has been credited with inspiring the modern mathematical domain of analytic
geometry.8 Both works proffer an algebraic problem set alongside its geometrical rendi-
tion, and I will be considering here the manner in which each text achieves its solution as
well as the relationship it posits between algebra and geometry. I pick these two examples
precisely because what we might call their “truth value” is the same. In its discussion of
quadratic equations, Descartes’ algebraic geometry is distinguished from al-Khwarizmi’s
Euclid-oriented algebra neither by the nature of the problem nor by the method used to
7Robert of Chester’s Latin Translation of the Algebra of Al-Khowarizmi, ed. and trans. Louis Charles Karpin-
ski, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1915. Citations to this edition will be indicated by page number in
body of essay. Karpinski’s prefatory material shows how widely disseminated knowledge of Al-Khwarizmi’s
work was from the late fifteenth century onwards – either directly, as in the case of Regiomontanus and
Luca Pacioli – or through Robert of Chester’s translation, as with Johann Scheybl, a professor of mathematics
at Tu¨bingen who in 1550 transcribed and prepared that translation for publication. Scheybl’s manuscript is
now in the Columbia University Library. “Mathematical science in Europe,” Karpinski writes, was more vitally
influenced by Mohammed ibn Musa than by any other writer from the time of the Greeks to Regiomontanus
(1436-1476)” (33).
8The question of whether Descartes did or did not invent analytical geometry has been much debated
by historians of mathematics. There seems little doubt that analytical geometry shares a number of the
mathematical techniques developed in the Ge´ome´trie, but, as Carl Boyer first argued, it remains unclear
whether Descartes’ mathematical thought was fully compatible with the basic notion undergirding analytical
geometry: that algebraic equations define curves in space. See Carl Boyer, History of Analytical Geometry,
New York: Scripta Mathematica, 102ff. “The analytical geometer,” according to Timothy Lenoir, “begins with
an equation in two or three variables and, by a suitable choice of a coordinate frame, produces a geometric
interpretation of that equation in two- or three-[dimensional] space.” In: “Descartes and the Geometrization
of Thought: The Methodological Background of Descartes’ Ge´ome´trie,” Historia Mathematica 6 (1979), 355-
79; here, 356. As we shall see, while Descartes admits the necessity of algebra, he refuses to prioritise
equations in this way. In fact, as H. J. M. Bos persuasively shows, how curves ought to be understood and
represented remained an open question for most seventeenth-century mathematicians, who “did not have a
uniform definition of the concept of a curve (nor apparently did they feel the need for such a definition) and
therefore. . . had no standard form for specifying the curves they had in mind.” Descartes intervenes here by
introducing “a sharp distinction between admissible and inadmissible curves” precisely on the grounds of
their constructibility. See Bos, “On the Representation of Curves in Descartes’ Ge´ome´trie,” Archive for History
of Exact Sciences 24 (1981), 295-338: here, 296 and 297.
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achieve its solution. Rather, what is new in the Ge´ome´trie’s approach is how it represents
the problem. In Lachterman’s words, at issue is “the source of the intelligibility of the fig-
ure (or statement)” as such. Thus, the crucial distinction concerns the mode of knowing,
which in turn “entails a difference in the mode of being” of what may otherwise seem to
be identical mathematical insights.9
In the fourth chapter of his treatise, al-Khwarizmi proposes finding the numerical value
of a “root,” that is, of an unknown quantity, when “squares [of that root] and roots are
equal to numbers.” The general case is represented through a specific instance. “The ques-
tion therefore in this type of equation,” he says, “is as follows: what is the square which
combined with ten of its roots will give a sum total of 39” (71). It is easier for us to under-
stand al-Khwarizmi’s modus operandus if we translate his verbal description into modern
algebraic notation. But I should emphasise that to do so is already to distort the text, since
one of its distinctive features is precisely that the problem is stated in prose and eschews
mathematical formalisation. His text poses problems and solutions in everyday language
and, throughout, uses determinate numbers rather than algebraic symbols. These features
reflect the ontological presuppositions of al-Khwarizmi’s mathematics. Mathematical ob-
jects, such as numbers or geometrical shapes, are in an important sense real objects; their
existence is of the same order as ours. Thus, for example, numbers are always positive.
There is no conception here of such a thing as a negative number, since the mode of its real
existence remains incomprehensible to him – to be a thing is, after all, to have a positive
existence.
At any rate, with this caveat in mind, let us nonetheless translate his narrative into
symbolic notation. If we represent our “root” or unknown by z, we are being asked to
uncover its numerical value, given the following equation:
z2 + 10z = 39 (1)
9Lachterman, Ethics of Geometry, ix and xi.
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In order to do so, Al-Khwarizmi tells the reader how to complete the square. And this
is one way we might do it today. Consider the square of (z + 5), which we arrive at by
multiplying the expression by itself.
(z + 5)2 = (z + 5) ∗ (z + 5) = z2 + 5z + 5z + 25 = z2 + 10z + 25 (2)
Now, from the original equation (1), we know that z2+10z = 39. Consequently, z2+10z+25
must equal 39 + 25, that is, 64. In short, by adding 25 to each side of the original equation
we can “complete the square” to get a numerical value for the expression (z + 5)2 in (2)
above. So, if z2 + 10z = 39, then
(z + 5)2 = 64 (3)
If we now take the square root of each side of this equation, we get
z + 5 =
√
64 = 8 (4)
and subtracting five from each side of this equation yields z = 3, producing a determinate
value for the “root” z.
As we shall shortly see, this logic, in its general form, can be applied in virtually the
same manner to the problem that Descartes’ Geometry will pose. But for the moment, let
us linger with al-Khwarizmi. Notably, our Arab mathematician does not seek to explain
algebraically – as I have sought to do above – why completing the square yields the correct
result. Instead, his statement of the problem is followed immediately by a description of
procedure:
The manner of solving this type of equation is to take one-half of the roots just
mentioned. Now the roots in the problem before us are 10. Therefore take 5,
which multiplied by itself gives 25, an amount which you add to 30, giving 64.
Having taken then the square root of this which is 8, subtract from it half of the
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roots, leaving 3. The number three therefore represents one root of this square,
which itself, of course, is 9 (73).
What al-Khwarizmi provides is a step-by-step route to the desired solution – it is fitting,
then, that the word algorithm derives from his name. As his many examples later in the
book suggest, such instructions make the mathematical “truth” operational, by allowing
them to be applied to mercantile transactions, the dividing of estates, and so on. However,
explanatory force does not lie in algebra itself. The truly mathematical domain is not that
of application but of demonstration.
That privilege is reserved for geometry. Corresponding to each of Al-Khwarizmi’s al-
gorithms is a set of geometrical diagrams aimed at proving the validity of the algebraic
procedure – and once legitimated thus, the method is freed as a practical technique use-
ful for everyday transactions. Thus it is that the treatise soon recognises that it has “said
enough,. . . so far as numbers are concerned” about different types of quadratic equations,
and signals instead its turn to geometry in the interests of verification: “Now, however, it is
necessary that we should demonstrate geometrically the truth of the same problems which
we have explained in numbers” (77).
The “proof” of the equation discussed above is ingenious, and testifies to the authori-
tative power of Euclidean geometry as an enduring model for establishing mathematical
truth.10 To this end, Al-Khwarizmi first seeks to represent the terms on the left-hand side
of original equation – that is, z2 + 10z – spatially. The term z2 can simply be visualised as
the area of square with side z, as in Fig 1.
To add an area corresponding to 10z to this figure, Al-Khwarizmi attaches four rect-
angles to this square, each of which has one side of the square as its longer side and
10As Karpinski points out, the “Greek influence on Arabic geometry is revealed by the order of the letters
employed on the geometrical figures.” These letters follow the natural Greek order rather than the Arabic,
and “the same is true. . . [for] the letters in the geometrical figures used by Al-Khowarizmi for verification
of his solutions of quadratic equations.. . . The Arabs were much more familiar with and grounded in Euclid
than are mathematicians today, and it was entirely natural in constructing new figures that they should
follow the order of lettering to which they had become accustomed in their study of Euclid” (21).
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Figure 1: Square of side z, with area z2. From the Columbia ms. of Johann Scheybl’s 1550
transcription of Robert of Chester’s Algebra.
one-fourth of ten as its shorter. That is, each constructed rectangle has an area of 2.5*z,
and the four taken together yield the requisite term 10z of the original equation. The re-
Figure 2: Constructed Figure representing z2 + 10z. From the Columbia ms.
sulting Fig. 2 thus represents z2 +10z geometrically, and its total area is 39, in accordance
with the original equation.
Finally, we simply complete the square of Fig. 2, by filling in the four small squares
at each corner. The side of each of these squares is the same as that of the rectangle to
which it is adjoined, namely, 2.5. Consequently, the area of each small square is 6.25, and
the combined area of all four is 25 (see Fig 3). Recalling that the area corresponding to
z2 + 10z – represented by the diagram in Fig 2 – is 39, the area of the completed square in
Fig 3 must be 39 + 25, that is is 64, which means in turn that the completed square has
a side of 8. A quick look at Fig 3 shows that this side comprises the side of the original
square of Fig 1 plus two of the sides of the small squares used to complete Fig. 2, that
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Figure 3: The Completed Square with side z + 5. From the Columbia ms.
is to say, the completed square has a side whose length z + 5. Therefore we can see that
z + 5 = 8, and it follows that z = 3.
Now, let us turn to Descartes’ Ge´ome´trie, which begins, too, with solving a simple
quadratic equation by completing its square. Unlike Al-Khowarizmi however, Descartes
does use algebraic symbols from the outset, and is, in theory, indifferent to whether a
number is positive or negative. Thus his ontological assumptions, be they in respect to
algebra or to geometry, are different from his Arabic predecessor’s. For instance, whereas
the latter’s Euclidean geometry is tied to the ontology of three-dimensional space, Carte-
sian geometry does not specify the nature of the being of its mathematical objects.11 The
same holds true for numbers as well – the symbolic language re-presents the numbers but
without specifying any further the nature of their existence as mathematical objects.
11Michael Mahoney states the case most forcefully, insisting that Descartes’ essential contribution to alge-
bra was that of abstracting mathematical operations from visual or physical space. Descartes’ mathematics,
he claims, is a science of “pure structure,” without any ontological foundation. See Michael S. Mahoney,
“Die Anfa¨nge der algebraischen Denkweise im 17. Jahrhundert,” Rete 1, 15-31: here, 29. This is perhaps too
strongly put, but there is no denying that Descartes seeks to separate his mathematics from the reference to
physical space that underlies Euclidean geometry. Thus, for example, the multiplication of two lines in the
Ge´ome´trie yields not a square (as in Al-Khwarizmi’s algebra) but another line. In the Discourse on the Method,
Descartes locates his initial success in overcoming the unsound reasoning of mathematicians and thinkers
before him in the decision to consider “the various relations and proportions subsisting among . . . objects
. . . in the most general form possible, without referring them to any objects in particular, . . . [so] that after-
wards I might be the better able to apply them to every other class of objects to which they are legitimately
applicable.” Further, he begins to treat all such relations as “subsisting between straight lines, than which I
could find no objects more simple, or capable of being more distinctly represented to my imagination and
senses.. . . In this way I believed I could borrow all that was best both in geometrical analysis and in algebra,
and correct all the defects of one by help of the other.”
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Descartes uses z to symbolise what Al-Khwarizmi calls the “root” of the quadratic equa-
tion – that is, the unknown whose value is to be determined. However, rather than using
numbers for the known quantities in an equation, Descartes represents these symbolically
as well, using a and b2 to designate the quantities corresponding to 10 and 39 in Al-
Khwarizmi’s case. These may be thought of as, to use a felicitous distinction, the “known
unknowns” in the equation. In other words, while also symbolically represented through
letters, a and b2 are quantities whose value can be decided upon by the mathematician,
and thus they can be treated as if they are numbers whose value is already known. The
task, then, is determine the value of z – the true unknown – in terms of what are taken to
be given: a, b2, and ordinary numbers.
In sum, Descartes proposes to solve the equation
z2 = az + b2 (5)
By subtracting az from each side of the equation, we can rewrite it in a form comparable
to Al-Khwarizmi’s z2 + 10z = 39:
z2 − az = b2 (6)
Now, we simply proceed in the manner already described earlier. Consider first the square
of (z − a
2
), that is, (z − a
2
) multiplied by itself:
(z − a
2
)2 = z2 − az
2
− az
2
+ (
a
2
)2 = z2 − az + (a
2
)2 (7)
But we know from equation 6 that z2 − az = b2. Therefore, completing the square by
adding (a
2
)2 to both sides of equation 6, we get an expression for square of (z− a
2
) in terms
of the given quantities a, b2, and ordinary numbers:
(z − a
2
)2 = b2 + (
a
2
)2 (8)
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Finally, taking the square root of each side, we get:
(z − a
2
) =
√
b2 + (
a
2
)2 (9)
And this result allows us to express z in terms of the known quantities, yielding
z =
a
2
+
√
b2 + (
a
2
)2. (10)
While I have spelt out the algebraic logic of Descartes’ solution in some detail, he him-
self skips over this exercise entirely, not even deigning to provide the kind of algorithm
that Al-Khwarizmi had offered. Instead, Descartes immediately seeks to give the original
equation 5 a geometrical interpretation and ‘solve’ the problem through an appropriate
geometrical construction. But the use and implication of geometry here are very different
from what obtains in Al-Khwarizmi’s example, where, as we saw, geometry was the locus
of verification, and the geometrical completion of the square the means whereby to prove
the truth of the algebraic procedure. In contrasting these two mathematical approaches
separated by more than half a millenium, I want to emphasise what has changed in the
relationship between algebra and geometry, not so much in the technical content of the
problem (which is essentially the same) but in how the problem is understood and repre-
sented.
But before turning to this relationship, let me quickly recount Descartes’ equally in-
genious geometrical solution. Unlike Al-Khwarizmi, who uses the areas of squares and
rectangles, Descartes relies on straight lines, circles and triangles (see Fig 4). This is how
he describes his geometrical approach to the equation z2 = az + b2:
I construct a right[-angled] triangle NLM in which the side LM is equal to b,
the square root of the known quantity b2, and the other side LN is [equal to]
1
2
a, [that is,] half the other known quantity which was multiplied by z. Then,
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Figure 4: Descartes’ Construction, from his Ge´ome´trie
prolonging MN, the hypotenuse of this triangle, to O, such that NO may be
equal to NL, [then] the whole [line] OM is the searched-for line z. And it is
expressed in this manner: z = a
2
+
√
b2 + (a
2
)2.12
Since LM = b and NL = 1
2
a, Pythagoras’ theorem tells us that the side NM =
√
b2 + (a
2
)2.
Thus NM represents the second term in the algebraic solution – see (10) – to the given
equation. To represent the unknown z as a line, we have to add to NM a geometrical
equivalent to the first term in the algebraic formula for z, that is, a
2
. Since we have con-
structed the line NL with the length a
2
, we need only to construct a circle centred on N,
with radius NL (see Fig 4). This construction ensures that the extension of the NM to touch
that circle will be a line whose length corresponds to z in the algebraic solution. In other
words, OM represents z and has the desired length of a
2
+
√
b2 + (a
2
)2, as in (10).
For Al-Khwarizmi, the geometrical construction demonstrated the truth of the algebraic
procedure; it showed why that procedure worked. By contrast, Descartes’ constructions do
not seek to prove the validity of the algebraic formula. Instead, they show that, given a
type of quadratic equation, we can produce its solution geometrically by constructing a
right-angled triangle out of the known coefficients and extending the hypotenuse of that
12Rene´ Descartes, The Geometry of Rene´ Descartes, trans. David Eugene Smith and Marcial L. Latham
(London: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1925), 13. Translation modified. Further citations indicated
by page number in body of essay.
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triangle appropriately. The resultant line OM is the geometrical result that corresponds
to the algebraic solution, and the construction reveals how that result can be generated
through geometry. As Lenoir puts it, “[t]he only object of concern [for Descartes] was
the geometric construction, and equations were employed simply as a shorthand way of
performing time-consuming geometrical operations. Equations themselves had no onto-
logical significance. They were only a useful symbolic language in which one could store
geometrical constructions.”13 The primary focus of Descartes’ Geometry is his solution to
the so-called Pappus problem, which he claimed had hitherto not been properly solved
using the appropriate geometrical means. But in this preliminary discussion of quadratic
equations, the mathematical attitude underlying Descartes’ mathematical approach to that
complex locus problem is already visible. There, as here, “the justification for his solution
[lies] in the fact that each algebraic manipulation he made. . . corresponded to a definite
geometrical operation.”14
In other words, for Descartes too the domain where truth resides is geometry. How-
ever, the diagram does not prove the validity of the algebraic formula (or, as in Khwarizmi’s
case, of the algebraic process) in an Euclidean manner. Rather, the appropriate geometrical
constructions – of drawing a triangle, extending the hypotenuse and so on – produce the
truth by making real or actualising a knowledge of the unknown. The otherwise opaque
algebraic formula is thus externalised through process of “solving” the problem geomet-
rically, and the act of construction produces truth as intelligibility, making evident to the
geometrician what the solution is. In this sense, construction transposes “mathematical
intelligibility and certainty from the algebraic to the geometric domain, from the interior
forum of the mind [namely, the purely mental sets assumptions that assign unity to a line,
or associate line lengths with algebraic variables, and so on] to the external forum of space
and body,”15 that is, into the evidentiary clarity of the geometrical diagram.
13Lenoir, “Descartes and the Geometrization of Thought,” 356.
14Lenoir, “Descartes and the Geometrization of Thought,” 358.
15Lachterman, Ethics of Geometry, viii.
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Thus, while the association of algebra with techne evident in Al-Khwarizmi’s treatise
holds true for Descartes as well, the primacy of geometry is very differently conceived.
For there is a fundamental, qualitative difference for Descartes between those who employ
mathematics properly, doing it the right way, and those “arithmeticians” who emphasise
only formal procedures, focusing on narrowly directed mechanical processes of calcula-
tion and proof. Briefly put, he draws a crucial distinction between acting mathematically
and merely performing mathematical acts. The value of algebraic symbolisation lies in
its allowing us to see parts of the problem that would disappear were we to rely only on
actual numbers. The representational language enables us to follow the connection from
one step in a solution process to another, by showing us how something develops and
how it depends on what has been given or already establised. But without care algebraic
manipulation becomes a mere craft, simply a mode of calculation. Thus, even though al-
gebraic symbolisation is certainly an important step because it frees calculation from an
attachment to specific numbers, it is not enough on its own. As we shall see, algebra’s
importance is as much social as it is conceptual – by helping us act mathematically, it
potentially differentiates us from those who simply perform mathematical acts. But, ulti-
mately, algebra remains too close to the idea of an algorithmic procedure in al-Khwarizmi’s
sense to be able to sustain the philosophical, social and ethical distinction so important to
Descartes.
Consequently – and in contrast to al-Khwarizmi’s celebration of algebra’s power to
solve a variety of practical problems – Descartes suppresses the algebraic process entirely.
He will not “pause here,” he tells us, “to explain this in greater detail, because I should
be depriving you of the pleasure of learning it for yourself, as well as the advantage of
cultivating your mind by training yourself in it, which is, in my opinion, the principal
advantage we can derive from this science [of algebra]” (18). Instead, he simply supplies
the outcome of the algebraic manipulation: a formula. But the formula has no significance
in and of itself. As Jones notes, it is linked by Descartes to a mechanical compass that
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he himself has invented, and whose task it is turn that formula into geometrical reality.16
Given a particular equation, the compass allows one to construct its solution, producing a
curve that translates the abstract algebraic result into a concrete, immediately graspable
image. I will return towards the end of this essay to suggest the relevance of Descartes’
compass to Sidney’s poetical practice (and vice versa), but for the moment we need only
retain its importance as an emblem for a fundamental aspect of Cartesian epistemology, its
insistence upon such geometric visualisation as the model for the clarity and distinctness
that are the primary characteristics of true knowing.
The knowledge produced by geometry is not as in al-Khwarizmi limited to a single
concrete example which we then generalise by analogy to similar cases, but underpins the
exuberant claim which comes at the end of Descartes’ treatise: of being able to generate
(as the formula already implicitly does) the solutions to an infinite number of related
problems:
But it is not my intention to write a thick book. Instead, I am trying rather
to include much in a few words, as perhaps you will judge that I have done,
if you consider that having reduced all the problems of a single class [d’un
mesme genre] to a single construction [une mesme construction], I have at the
same time given the method of reducing them to an infinity of other different
problems, and thus solving each of them in an infinity of ways. . . . We have
only to follow the same method in order to construct all problems to an infinite
degree of complexity. For in terms of mathematical progressions, once we have
the first two terms, it is not difficult to find the others. (240)
In a sense, without deciding upon the numerical values for the known unknowns a and
b, we cannot actually carry out the required construction. But the imagined geometrical
operations produce for Descartes an intuitive grasp of the general solution represented
16See Jones, The Good Life, 34ff.
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by the algebraic formula, and bring with it a mastery over the entire class of particular
solutions generated by the infinite set of numerical values which can be ascribed to a
and b. Central to Descartes’ endeavour here is the notion that geometrical construction
functions as a creative or generative source, infinitely capable of producing truth.
In Descartes’ approach to the quadratic equation we begin to see a close link between
constructibility – the geometrical equivalent of poesis – and the existence or objective re-
ality of mathematical concepts. The construction he asks us to perform is a deliberate in-
strumental or mental operation aimed at producing an individual figure that is accessible
to the intuition. This intuition bestows objectivity on the mathematical concept, bringing
it in a manner of speaking into existence in a way that would not be possible without
the construction. The distinction between the evidence of a proof and its formal certainty
that Jones underscores in his reading of Descartes speaks centrally to this issue. As Jones
puts it, “formal demonstrations, like syllogisms or other logical forms of proof, could, in
[Descartes’] eyes, produce a kind of certainty. They did not, however, make evident the
connections on was proving.”17 And for Descartes, all knowledge has to have the clarity
and intuitive obviousness that our knowledge of the simplest truths possesses – and such
knowledge is not simply there, in the nature of the object, but has to be constructed; it
demands the operation of the mind, its inventiveness, to make the mathematical concept
real, and indeed bring it into being. It does not suffice to assent to the truth of something;
it is necessary above all for that truth to be grasped with an intuitive immediacy.
Thus, Descartes’ geometry shifts the very status of mathematical objects in ways that re-
flect the tension I have pointed out to above in discussing Sidney’s use of mimesis – briefly,
the question of whether poetry (or in this case, geometrical construction) re-presents or re-
makes the natures to which it relates. This tension can be traced back to the foundational
text of Western geometry, Euclid’s Elements. One indication of an ultimately unresolved
double perspective emerges in the two ways in which Euclidean propositions conclude:
17Jones, The Good Life, 29.
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usually, QED [Quod erat demonstrandum or, in the original Greek, hoper edei deixal], but
sometimes QEF [Quod erat faciendum or hoper edei poesai]. While Euclid himself does not
explicitly comment on this distinction, it nonetheless implicitly raises two important ques-
tions that are still alive for Descartes: (1) what share should fall to making or poesis in
the progressive unfolding of mathematical theorems or problems, and (2) how does the
temporality of making bear upon the being of mathematical concepts themselves?18
An indication that construction plays a different role in Euclidean geometry is sug-
gested by the fact that the Elements almost invariably use the present perfect imperative
to describe the constructive operation, so that bisecting a line segment is expressed as “let
it have been cut in two,” and so on. In other words, rather than giving the reader instruc-
tions (as Descartes does above) in how to carry out the operation, the text insists on the
impersonality of what is being done. Moreover, the perfect tense marks the relevant con-
struction as already having been executed prior to the reader’s encounter with the proof.
As Lachterman puts it,
In a Euclidean proposition nothing moves or is moved save our eyes and, per-
haps, minds as we follow the transition from step to step. . . . The diagram we
see exhibits the antecedently executed operations the outcome of which is now
confronting us. . . . The temporality figured in the student’s coming to know
the truth of a proposition by moving through its parts is not, or so it seems,
inherited from a temporality intrinsic to the [mathematical] “beings” on which
Euclidean mathesis is focused.19
While Euclid is notoriously reticent in terms of providing philosophical interpretations or
details that would allow us to pin him down, the implication of these aspects of his Ele-
ments is that the movements of graphic constructions do not “‘create’ or ‘realise’” the nature
of the geometrical objects they deal with, but rather they “evoke or allow it to make its
18I draw here on Lachterman’s detailed analysis of Euclid in The Ethics of Geometry, 25-123.
19Lachterman, Ethics of Geometry, 66-67.
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intelligible presence ‘felt’”20 In Descartes’ Ge´ome´trie, by contrast, despite the wariness with
regard to technical procedure (as in his suspicions concerning algebra), the constructions
nonetheless partake of the making, the poetic force of technical operations, and are thus
closely allied to the creation or realisation of the mathematical concepts.
Making Poetry
The idea that public spaces we inhabit and share depend upon the right way – whether
through geometry or literature – of making objects, and thereby ourselves, leads us back
to Sidney. The English poet consistently sees the arts and the sciences as fundamentally
human endeavours, and therefore necessarily directed towards the same ends:
Some an admirable delight drew to music, and some the certainty of demon-
stration to the mathematics; but all, one and other, having this scope: to know,
and by knowledge to lift up the mind from the dungeon of the body to the
enjoying his own divine essence. (219)
However, knowledge is not valuable for its own sake. Rather, what is important is that
knowledge be directed towards virtuous action. In noting that the “mathematician might
draw forth a straight line with a crooked heart” (219), Sidney distinguishes between the
local ends of a particular knowing and the final cause it serves: as with other modes of
knowing, mathematics is directed to the “highest end of mistress knowledge, . . . which
stands . . . in the knowledge of a man’s self, in the ethic and politic consideration, with
the end of well-doing, and not of well-knowing only” (219). What he voices, then, is an
understanding of mathematics as a profoundly ethical and moral domain – and it is in on
this basis that Sidney asserts poetry’s superiority, as the art most apt to combine theory and
practice, and by so doing shape human nature — thereby producing judgment not simply
as a formal knowing but as “lively knowledge”:
20Lachterman, Ethics of Geometry, 121.
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A perfect picture, I say, for he yieldeth to the powers of the mind an image
of that whereof the philosopher bestoweth but a wordish description which
doth never strike, pierce nor possess the sight of the soul so much as that other
doth.. . . Or of a gorgeous palace, and architector . . . might well make the hearer
to repeat, as it were, by rote all he had heard, yet should never satisfy his in-
ward conceit with being witness to itself of a true lively knowledge. But the
same man, as soon as he might see . . . the house well in model, should straight-
aways grow without need of any description to a judicial comprehending of
[it]. (221-22).
Geometry is poetic in that it makes just such an image, and it is the ethical force of such
making that connects Descartes and Sidney, linking mathematics and poetry as productive
of an ethos that will ultimately demarcate of the boundaries and conditions of entry of a
public space. As human beings, we are subject of course to inevitable limitations: “the
final end is to lead and draw us to as high a perfection as our degenerate souls, made
worse by their clayey lodging, can be capable of” (219). Nevertheless, mathematics and
literature, in their Cartesian and Sidney-an guises respectively, not only posit the shared
capacity as human beings to reach toward knowledge, but also instantiate poetic modes
through which we re-form ourselves so as to be capable of creating and entering the spaces
of public life.
But what poets (or philosophers) say is not necessarily what poets (or philosophers)
do – or, at the very least, their doing is very rarely transparent to their saying. I would
like therefore to turn to an instance of Sidney’s practice, to illustrate one way in which he
expresses the alliance between geometry and poetry in the very form of his poetic matter.
Let us consider the much-studied opening sonnet of Sidney’s Astrophil and Stella sequence
– a poem especially memorable for its penultimate image of the pregnant poet, “helpless
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in [his] throes, biting [his] truant pen (ll. 12-3).21
The poem’s opening sestet famously deploys the classical rhetorical figure of the gra-
datio or ladder in the step-by-step movement through which the narrator imagines Stella
logically progressing to a stage where she might be willing to “entertain” (l. 6) his desires.
Loving in truth, and fain in verse my love to show,
That she (dear she) might take some pleasure of my pain;
Pleasure might cause her read, reading might make her know;
Knowledge might pity win, pity grace obtain;
I sought fit words to paint the blackest face of woe,
Studying inventions fine, her wits to entertain (ll. 1-6)
We begin by assuming a desired objective: a “truth” evident to the poet – loving – needs to
be expressed “in verse.” However, this “show[ing]” does not aim simply to express the self
but to produce a pleasure in the other, since the poet further imagines that the addressee
will derive an immediate pleasure from the mere production of the poem itself, seeing
(sadistically) in the poetic object as such an index of the writer’s pain. As line 3 suggests,
this pleasure is prior to actually reading the poem: before all else, the verse “show[s],”
the visual and performative implication of the verb being amplified in line 6 when the
poet seeks the right language “to paint” his “woe.” In short, her act of reading does not
automatically follow upon the writing, but has itself to be stimulated by the pleasure she
takes another’s pain, to which the verse will point. Once the affect is set in motion thus,
each successive link in the logical chain seems to follows rigorously upon its predecessor,22
each action almost algorithmically generating the next, each proposition entailed by the
one that came before: pleasure leads to reading, reading to knowing, knowing to winning
21All quotations from Sidney’s verse come from Duncan-Jones’ A Critical Edition of the Major Works, op.
cit.
22I say ‘seems’ because the strength of the connection between each step is weakened by the reiterated
“might,” suggesting the residual uncertainty attending every transition. The tension between a strictly logical
entailment and the possibility of a failure at each junction is perhaps heightened by the echo of the other
primary meaning of “might”: power or force.
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pity, pity to obtaining grace. Step by step she climbs the ladder, raising him in turn as she
advances. All that remains for the narrator is to execute this poetic programme – in all
senses of the word – by turning to what others have already written, rifling through their
“leaves” (l. 7) to con their “inventions fine” (l. 6).
However, here the projected process breaks down: studious imitation of others not only
fails to aid the poet but actively hinders him, their verse stubbornly refusing appropriation:
“others’ feet still seemed but strangers in my way” (l. 11). The result is a painful stasis,
the poetic birth of the voice is forcibly checked, leaving the poet “helpless in [his] throes.”
The “truant” pen refuses to be commanded, and agency is only conceivable in the circular
form of self-flagellation, its energy directed entirely inwards. If the circle was, as the long
tradition from Aristotle to Kepler maintained, a symbol of perfection, it had also become,
especially with the advent of Hindu-Arabic numerals, the cipher of nothingness. And,
tragically as well as comically, Sidney looks in both directions: in his end is his beginning
(recall the comic conclusion to Sonnet 45, “pity the tale of me”) – and vice versa.
What the sonnet stages, then, before the volta of its concluding line – where his muse
steps in to save the day – is an anatomy of failure. What the poem dissects, though, is
not merely a contingent failure – that of this particular poet’s endeavour here and now
to win over this particular addressee. Rather, it lays before us the failure of a (poetic)
mode. The inability to make a poem able to set the imagined algorithm in motion signals
a failure internal to – and, indeed, constitutive of – the mimetic paradigm (or at least of
one influential understanding of that paradigm) the narrator initially adopts. It needs to
be emphasised that the fundamental problem does not lie in the imagined concatenation
of dependent events leading to the desired-for “grace.” The centre of the poem focuses
instead on the difficulty of the initial construction itself, which is meant to trigger the
subsequent algorithmic process.
Captured in that multivalent word “invention” (repeated thrice in lines 6 through 10),
Sidney’s difficulty reflects the tension I have identified above in both the Defense and in
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the contrast between Euclidean and Cartesian construction. On the one hand, to study the
“inventions fine” of others in order “to paint the blackest face of woe” construes invention
as a discovery of what is already there, a finding-out on the basis of already produced
poetic constructions. To invent in this sense is closer to the use of the verb and its variants
in contemporary accounting manuals, where the discovery of gains and losses, what was
coming in and what was going out, was achieved by taking inventory. Even more perti-
nently, in this aspect invention is allied with analysis in terms of the classical opposition
between analysis as a method of discovery and synthesis as a method of demonstration. In
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, for instance – a text with which Sidney was deeply famil-
iar, as his correspondence shows – this distinction is formulated via the contrast between
means and ends: analysis assumes the objective or end, taking it to be already given, in
order to focus on the means whereby the end may be achieved. And this is precisely the
attitude that seems to governs the poem’s first half, where the narrator assumes showing
his “truth” – loving – and its practical correlate – obtaining “grace” – as his objectives, to
turn his attention instead to the techne or praxis through which those objectives may be
realised. The initial poetic construction – much like its geometrical counterpart in Euclid –
is not meant to demonstrate something new – for instance, to show the poetic equivalent
of a Euclidean theorem; rather it is a means, that which has to be made in order achieve a
certain end.
But this notion of invention proves itself inadequate, and Sidney’s turn away from copy-
ing others’ constructions pre-figures the Cartesian turn away from Euclidean construction.
Drawing on Aristotelian terminology, Descartes distinguishes, as we have seen, “between
acting geometrically and performing a geometrical act”:
Acting geometrically requires that one perform a geometrical act from knowl-
edge of the underlying interconnections and that one chooses to do so given
the end of creating more intuitive knowledge. A formally valid calculation or
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geometric construction might either be merely a geometrical act or be a product
of acting geometrically.23
In other words, for Descartes, formal logical consequence or for that matter a step-by-step
sequence in a proof may be necessary for producing certainty but it nonetheless falls short
of the kind of clear and distinct evidence that truly characterises knowledge. Even if I am
certain of a relationship between A and E because I consent to the series of relations A:B,
B:C, C:D, D:E, “I do not on that account see what the relationship is between A and E,
nor can the truths previously learnt give me a precise knowledge of it unless I recall them
all.”24 What is further needed is an intuitive – or as Jones puts it, “poetic” – grasp of the re-
lationship between A and E, so that their interconnection possesses the kind of evidentiary
vividness or force characteristic of our grasp of any of those intermediate relationships.
And the limits Descartes attributes to the formal certainty of mathematical demonstrations
– as Sidney does in the case of poetic demonstrations – shape his ambivalent response to
the prior labours of others: “In slavishly imitating and assenting to proof, one allows rea-
son to ‘amuse’ oneself and thereby one loses the habit of reasoning.”25 What Sidney loses
in reasoning as he does is the habit of poetry itself.
To break out of the resulting impasse, Sidney must turn invention in poesis inside out,
as Descartes does construction in geometry, making it instead the avenue of creation, the
way of bringing forth something new, a “heart-ravishing knowledge” as the Defense puts
it, when recounting that the Romans called a poet “vates, which is as much as a diviner,
forseer, or prophet” (214). Thus, across its repeated iterations in lines 6 through 10, the
meaning of invention shifts: the alliance between study and invention announced in line
6 (“[s]tudying inventions fine”) mutates into disjunction in line 10, where invention as
“nature’s child” is opposed to the martinet-like rigour of what has now become the false
23Jones, The Good Life, 32.
24Descartes,“Rules for the Direction of the Mind,” in The Philosophical Works, vol. I, 25.
25Jones, The Good Life, 27.
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mother: “Invention, nature’s child, fled step-dame study’s blows” (l. 10). Sidney’s associa-
tion of a transformed invention with nature’s fecundity is already hinted by the intervening
hope that “[s]ome fresh and fruitful showers” might “flow” upon his “sunburnt brain” (l.
7-8) – and this connection sets up, too, the situation which will result from not making use
of invention’s natural fertility: a pregnancy that refuses to end, suspending nature’s issue.
Indeed, the sonnet elegantly negotiates the shift between these two senses of invention in
lines 6 and 10 respectively through the ambivalence expressed in the intermediate line 9:
“But words came halting forth, wanting invention’s stay.” The multivalence of both “want-
ing” – desiring and lacking – and “stay” – delay and hindrance, but also support – captures
the dynamic balance between different senses of invention, between mimesis as imitation
and as creation.
The distinctness and clarity of poetic production in Sonnet 1 is conveyed by both the
brevity and tone of the muse’s intervention, when it admonishes the poet by pointing out
the obvious: “‘Fool,’ said my muse to me; ‘look in thy heart, and write’” (l. 14). As in the
Defence, the evidentiary vividness is located in the heart, for it is only by looking there that
one can ‘invent’ the poem, and thereby act poetically (that is, write) rather than merely
perform a poetic act (which first six lines of the poem describe, and whose failure the next
six recount). If for Descartes, the geometrical construction that follows algebraic analysis
converts the formal and symbolic logic of algebraic manipulation into an intuitive grasp
of truth akin indeed to divination, the turn inward to the heart in this sonnet likewise
achieves a re-vision; it changes the very mode of seeing: from the observation of a series
of mechanical movements between causes and effects into an almost vatic insight into the
totality of their deeper, underlying connectedness.
But this not mean that the algebraic process, the concatenation of causes and effects
in algorithmic fashion, is in itself a mistake. As I have suggested above, this is far from
being the case. Indeed, for Descartes, the symbolic representation of geometric lines in
order to produce a set of equations that can be solved is a crucial and necessary step, for
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it is through algebra that the gaps in the process leading from known things to unknown
ones is filled. As Descartes puts it, the algebraic movement does not being into being
“a new kind of identity”; instead, it extends “our entire knowledge of the question to
the point where we perceive that the thing we are looking for participates in this way or
that way in the nature of things given in the statement of the problem.”26 Algebra is thus
a necessary but temporary help to achieve the geometric construction, which truly does
bring something new into being, not just visually but in that it produces a vivid knowledge
of the interconnection among things, or among a set of geometrical objects.
Hence, Cartesian geometry in a strict sense repeats algebraic labour – though in order
ultimately to discard algebra as mere techne, excessive focus on which blocks understand-
ing. This attitude is best captured by Descartes’ famous compass (see Fig. 5). Descartes
Figure 5: Descartes’ Compass
envisions here a system of linked rulers. A pivot at Y connects the rulers YX and YZ, the
latter remaining fixed while the former rotates. The ruler BC is fixed perpendicular to YX
at B, while the remaining rulers parallel to it (DE and FG), slide perpendicularly along
YX when pushed by DC and FE respectively. As the angle of the instrument is XYZ is
26Rene´ Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, trans. John Cottingham et al. (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1984-91), vol. 1, 56. Also cited in Jones, The Good Life, 33.
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opened by rotating YX, “the ruler BC. . . pushes toward Z the ruler CD, which slides along
YZ always at right angles. In like manner, CD pushes DE, which slides along YX always
parallel to BC; DE pushes EF; EF pushes FG; FG pushes GH; and so on.”27 In short, the
initial motion generates a series of curves. Point B (which is fixed on XY) traces a circle,
while points D, F, and H (which slide along YX) trace other, more complex curves indicated
by dotted lines in Fig. 5.28 By translating the steps of the algebraic equation into appro-
priate curves through a continuous motion (or through several successive motions, each
regulated by those which precede), Descartes’ instrument showed that “however compos-
ite a motion is, the resulting curve can be conceived in a clear and distinct way, and is
therefore acceptable in geometry.”29 The overarching epistemological enterprise, in whose
service this mechanical instrument was designed, demanded, too, a constructive repetition
of algebraic analysis:
Algebraic work produces a formula. The newly created algebraic formula guides
the construction of a machine, which draws a curve. This curve/machine com-
plex makes the interconnection among the geometrical objects evident. In this
process, algebra enables us to get to this geometric order. An algebraic formula,
however, should not substitute for knowledge of the geometric order it can help
produce.30
This Cartesian production of an epistemological difference in and through repetition
points to a final implication of Sidney’s understanding of mimesis and invention, and leads
27Descartes, Ge´ome´trie, 318.
28In terms of Descartes’ insistence on the need to grasp the intermediate terms in a proof sequence con-
necting an initial term A to a final term E via the series of relations A:B, B:C, C:D, D:E (cited above), the
compass generates a series of similar triangles – YBC, YDE, and so on – which make visible these mean
proportionals characterising the algebraic equation
29Bos, “Curves in Descartes’ Ge´ome´trie, 310. This was not the only compass Descartes dreamt up, for it only
involved straight lines as the moving parts. He also envisioned other, more complex devices that combined
the movement of straight lines with the motions of simpler curves.
30Jones, The Good Life, 34. The compass, as a mechanical device, falls under the same injunction circum-
scribing algebra’s role. In itself it is no more than an instrument, but through its appropriate use geometry
reveals itself as poesis.
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to another sense in which Sidney’s ends and beginnings are intricated. For we should
note that muse’s injunction in the sonnet’s concluding line returns, through the poet’s
self-reflection, to the poem’s beginning, since arguably the poem we have just read is the
product of his having taken the muse’s advice to heart. Just as geometrical construction
repeats the algebraic, exposing both its truth and its limits in the production of intuitive
knowledge, so too what is triggered by looking into the heart is a poem that rehearses
its own failure in order vividly to express the difference internal to repetition, the other
side of mimesis: invention as nature’s child. It is through the dynamic repetition – and
disavowal of – their own conditions of possibility that both poetic and geometric construc-
tions themselves come into being, reinventing themselves by inventing the techniques they
will ultimately seek to displace.
Coda: Fables to Live By
Jean-Luc Nancy’s rich if elusive essay on Descartes takes its title from Jan Weenix’s 1647
portrait of the philosopher, which shows him holding an open book on whose left page is
inscribed mundus est fabula, the world is a fable. The phrase ought not to be taken, Nancy
argues, as repeating the Baroque commonplace that the world around us is illusory, no
more real than fable. Rather, it points to the constitutive place of the fable in the Cartesian
invention of the thinking subject, upon whose certitude all knowledge of the world is
built.31 The opening chapter of the Discourse on the Method makes this fabulatory motive
explicit:
Thus my design is not to teach here the method which everyone ought to follow
in order to direct his reason well, but only to show how I have tried to direct my
own. . . . But, putting forward this work as a history [histoire], or, if you prefer,
as a fable [fable] in which, among a few examples one may imitate, one will
31Jean-Luc Nancy, “Mundus est Fabula,” MLN 93 (4), 635-653: here 635-37.
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perhaps find many others that one will be right not to follow, I hope that it will
be useful to some without being harmful to any, and that all will be grateful to
me for my frankness [franchise] (83; translation modified).32
As Nancy perceptively notes, Descartes’ text does not itself “imitatively borrow the traits of
a literary genre.. . . If fable here. . . is to introduce fiction, it will do so through a completely
different procedure. It will not introduce fiction ‘upon’ truth or beside it, but within it.”33
This distinction, wherein fiction-making enters into the very interior of truth, ought to be
recognisable to us in Sidney’s own justification for poetry’s aptitude for (truthful) feigning
– which is not, he emphasises, tantamount to lying because it never purported to be liter-
ally true to begin with. Or, as Descartes defends his invention of the world in Le Monde,
it is not that one seeks to present “the things that are actually in the true world,” but of
“feigning one at random. . . that nevertheless could be created just as I will have feigned
it.”34
The motif of the fable also opens a more unexpected connection between Sidney and
Descartes. As is well known, in 1595 Sidney’s Defence also appeared in a different edi-
tion and was called instead An Apology for Poetry. The implications of this alternate title
are rich. Margaret Ferguson points out that the word apology derives from apo, mean-
ing away and logia or speaking, and thus came to signify “a speech in defense.” However,
the Renaissance conflated this with the Greek word apologos, which meant story or fable,
generalising this term to apply to didactic allegories such as Aesop’s fables. “[F]or Renais-
sance defenders of poetry, there was a special link between apologos and apologia, a link
32The motif of the fable recurs in the Discourse – for example, in the ensuing discussion of the learning of
the Schools – as well as in The World [Le Monde], which was suppressed from publication by the author upon
hearing of the condemnation of Galileo in 1632. In that earlier text, Descartes solicitously tells the reader
that he wishes “to envelop a part of it with the invention of a fable” so that “you will find the length of this
discourse less tedious.” Through this fable, he hopes “that truth will always be sufficiently visible, and that
it will be no less pleasant to behold than if I exposed it in all its nakedness.” Cited in Nancy, “Mundus est
Fabula,” 639.
33Nancy, “Mundus est Fabula,” 638.
34Cited in Nancy, “Mundus est Fabula,” 639.
30
suggested not only by the fact that both terms were sometimes translated as ‘apologie’
in sixteenth-century England, but also by a Platonic text that was crucial to Renaissance
justifications of poetry,” Plato’s Republic.35
References to Plato’s banishing of poets from the ideal republic abound in Sidney’s
Apology. And the very first mention of Plato emphasises the fabulous dimensions of his
thought:
And truly even Plato whoever well considereth shall find in the body of his
work, though the inside and strength were philosophy, the skin, as it were, and
beauty depended most on poetry: for all standeth upon dialogues, wherein he
feigneth many honest burgesses of Athens to speak of such matters, that, if they
had been set on the rack, they would never have confessed them. . . (213).
Not only does Sidney see the very dialogic form as inherently poetic, but he recognises
clearly the extent to which Platonic truth is communicated through invention: feigning
their words extracts the “honesty” of the Athenians beyond anything that torture can
achieve. Plato’s own recourse to fables and myths at key junctures in his dialogues –
Sidney notes the strategic “interlacing” of what might seem “mere tales, as Gyges’ ring and
others” (213) – is echoed in the framing fable with which the Apology opens. In a gesture
that anticipates the ostensible humility of Descartes’ presenting his life as a fable, Sidney
self-deprecatingly prefaces his own – unavoidably solipsistic – defense of poetry with the
diverting story of John Pietro Pugliano, whose equestrian responsibilities lead him exces-
sively “to exercise[] his speech in praise of his faculty.” “Had I not been a piece of a logician
before I came to him,” Sidney muses, “I think he would have persuaded me to have wished
myself a horse. But thus much at least his no few words drave into me, that self-love is
better than any gilding to make us seem gorgeous wherein ourselves be parties” (212).
35Margaret W. Ferguson, Trials of Desire: Renaissance Defenses of Poetry (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1983), 2-3.
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It is likewise through the fable of Descartes’ own intellectual autobiography that the
Cartesian thinking subject shows itself. Descartes refuses the position of authority from
which his method can be taught, and even suggests that this frank display of himself may
have only a very limited exemplary function as model to be fruitfully imitated. Indeed,
a little later the Discourse distances itself even further from its potential use as imitative
model:
If my work has pleased me enough that I show you its model [mode`le] here, it
is not because I wish to advise anybody to imitate it. Those upon whom God
has bestowed more of his graces will perhaps form designs more elevated; but I
do fear that for many this [work itself] may already be too audacious. The sole
resolve of undoing all the opinions that one has formerly received [auparavant
en sa cre´ance] is not an example that each man should follow. And the world
may be said to be mainly composed of two sorts of minds to which it is not in
the least suited (90; translation modified).
Descartes’ notion of the private and particular self is itself a product of an awareness of a
collective, a “public” for whom the author cannot in any direct sense serve as a model to
be copied. Put another way, (auto)biography is itself created in the gesture that posits the
subject’s life as heuristic fiction.
The Cartesian fable thus appears a paradoxical beast, both exemplary and, in a funda-
mental sense, inimitable. And this double articulation is, I wish to suggest, distinctive of
Sidney as well. To sharpen the paradox, we might say that both writers show themselves
as imitable precisely in their inimitability. In other words, simply to copy what they do
would be the equivalent of merely performing geometrical or poetical acts – the failure of
which the opening sonnet of Astrophil and Stella stages. Truly to imitate them, by contrast,
would be to take their very inimitability as model, that is to say, to inhabit (as they do)
a process of invention whose characteristic is a distinctive internal swerve within inher-
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ited traditions, a repetition that produces difference in the form of singularity.36 As Nancy
writes apropos Descartes (in words that we could easily apply to Sidney’s poetical practice
as well), “if the worlds of fiction and reality are not identical, what instead is identical –
yielding Descartes’ very identity — is the activity of invention and creation.. . . The subject
of true knowledge must be the inventor of his own fable.”37
Consequently, to put the case in Sidney’s terms, what one is enjoined to imitate is less
either the “matter” or the “manner” (see p. 248) of their geometrical and/or poetical
creations than something more like their attitude with respect to the very relationship be-
tween matter and manner. Richard Young aptly describes the poet-lover of Sidney’s sonnet
sequence as a “Janus-figure. . . looking in both directions: within the dramatic context to-
ward the lady and beyond it toward a reader.”38 While the dramatic fiction is lent a solidity
by Sidney’s evocation of his own biography throughout the sonnet sequence, it is equally
the sequence itself which invents the life, by creating and re-creating, for instance, the
figure of Stella (and, concomitantly, the figure of Astrophel) from sonnet to sonnet. In
turn, showing the self through the shapes it creates constitutes the mode of address out-
ward: the singular and virtuoso display of literary imitation turned inside out calls for an
audience whose ‘imitation’ of the poet would ideally take the poet’s singularity as model,
reading it – to borrow again Nancy’s description of Descartes’ Discourse – as the “fable
of the generality of a singular and authentic action.”39 What poesis brings into being for
Sidney, as geometrical construction does for Descartes, is the degree to which the making
of the verbal (or visual) image produces an exemplarity that is generalisable not via direct
36Gilles Deleuze’s distinction between generality and repetition is apposite here: “[I]t is not Federation day
which commemorates or represents the fall of the Bastille, but the fall of the Bastille which celebrates and
repeats in advance all the Federation days; or Monet’s first water lily which repeats all the others. Generality,
as generality of the particular, thus stands opposed to repetition as universality of the singular. The repetition
of a work of art is like a singularity without a concept, and it is not by accident that a poem must be learned
by heart.” In: Difference and Repetition (London: The Athlone Press, 1994), 1.
37Nancy, “Mundus est Fabula,” 639-40.
38Richard B. Young, “English Petrarke: A Study of Astrophel and Stella,” in Three Studies in the Renaissance:
Sidney, Jonson, Milton, 1958, 9.
39Nancy, “Mundus est Fabula,” 641.
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likeness but in the very mode of relating to the world that it exemplifies.
But if the question be for your own use and learning, whether it be better to
have it set down as it should be, or as it was, then certainly is more doctrinable
the feigned Cyrus in Xenophon than the true Cyrus in Justin, and the feigned
Aeneas in Virgil than the right Aeneas in Dares Phrygius (224).
It is worth noting that the Oxford English Dictionary traces the first use of the word indi-
vidual to signify “a single human being, as opposed to Society, the Family, etc.” to the early
seventeenth century.40 One might say that Sidney and Descartes envisage the creation of
this individual precisely through individual creation. And it is on the shifting sands of such
a fabulous foundation that their publics would be built.
40The OED cites J. Yates’ 1626 Ibis ad Caesarem: “The Prophet saith not, God saw every particular man in
his blood, or had compassion to say to every individual, Thou shalt live.” Entry under 3a, spelling modernised.
My thanks to Diana Henderson for bringing this point to my attention.
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